
AN INDEPENDENT CASE STUDY

Ecosystem Design for the Human–AI Economy

From knowledge sharing to skill application and economic value creation



Dessi Popova

HUMAN–AI ECOSYSTEM DESIGN

NOVEMBER 2026

A LinkedIn Case Study

in Ecosystem Design, Member Success, and Platform Economics

The Central Question

> *If professional networks make money from professionals building a livelihood, shouldn't their success depend on helping those professionals succeed?*

DESSI POPOVA

NOVEMBER 2026

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PUBLICATION NOTES

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Executive Summary

An independent, practitioner-led case study for leaders responsible for the design, economics, and development of professional networks.

Professional networks have always created value by connecting people with knowledge and opportunity. They earned from it through hiring, subscriptions, and advertising, which sells members' attention.

AI has changed the first half of that. Much of what once depended on finding the right specialist can now be retrieved on demand, and the content competing for members' attention has multiplied.

The next thing platforms could harvest is intention. AI systems can increasingly infer what a person plans to do, such as which job they are thinking of leaving or what they want to build. Researchers at the University of Cambridge describe a possible intention economy, in which signals like these are sold before the person has acted on them (Chaudhary and Penn, 2024). This case study makes no claim that LinkedIn does this. It is a choice every platform now faces: a platform that understands what people intend to do can use that to influence what they buy, or to help them accomplish what they chose to do.

This case study argues for a different path. When members say what they want, a platform can use it to help them get there: find the right people, put what they know to use, and earn from it. That turns an attention-harvesting engine into a functioning economy, one that grows because its members do.

It also names a structural problem in how LinkedIn earns today. Newly independent specialists and established corporations may buy visibility through the same auction-based advertising products, despite having very different resources, reputations, and commercial needs.

> *If AI can make knowledge available on demand, what additional value should professional networks provide?*

The opportunity is to help people turn what they know into skills they can show, and into work they do with others. Companies are rethinking how knowledge work is organized, and many experienced professionals are going independent. Neither group needs more information. Both need a place to put what they know to work.

LinkedIn is the case I use. It has identity, relationships, learning, hiring, AI, and commercial systems, and its 2026 product announcements show that it is investing in independent work and professional discovery. The question is whether these parts form a coherent journey from expertise to opportunity. The proposals describe what I would do if I were LinkedIn, and they are written so that other professional networks, marketplaces, community platforms, and companies can take what fits their own situation.

The Human–AI Ecosystem Design framework behind them examines four connected decisions: who members are, what they say they want compared with their observed behavior, how they progress, and how the platform earns revenue as that progression becomes valuable.

Most of what I propose builds on things LinkedIn already has. LinkedIn is already working on several of these areas. Each row starts with something a member runs into today, and ends with what LinkedIn already has that it could build on.

WHAT A MEMBER RUNS INTO TODAY	WHAT THEY COULD DO INSTEAD	WHAT LINKEDIN ALREADY HAS
LinkedIn guesses what I want. I read three posts about AI and my feed fills up with AI, even though I'm building a consulting business.	Tell LinkedIn "I'm going independent and looking for partners," see how it understood me, and fix it. *(My Professional Priorities, section 14)*	An Interest Picker for new members at signup
I can't find the people I chose to follow. They're buried between ads and posts from strangers.	Decide how much of my feed comes from people I follow, so I see them first instead of strangers and ads. *(Feed balance, section 15)*	A separate Network feed, in testing
I don't know why I'm shown something. And I can't find a collaborator, only creators to follow.	See a reason ("because you're building a service in organizational design") and find people to work with, not just read. *(Explained discovery, section 16)*	AI that recommends whom to follow
I don't know how to tell my own story. AI can polish my wording, but it doesn't know my career journey.	Get free, guided help to put what I'm good at into words, and book an expert if I want more. *(Profile help, section 19)*	AI profile writing suggestions
Ads cost me what they cost a corporation. With a few hundred connections, I'm in the same auction as a global company.	Use Premium Career to build my own work, not only to find a job, and pay for reach when I'm ready. *(Premium Career, section 27)*	Ads from $10 a day, written for companies
I have to pay before I've earned anything. To sell an advice session, I need Premium Business first.	Sell my first session and pay LinkedIn a fee only when someone books. *(Earn before paying, section 27)*	Advice Sessions, behind Premium
The group I joined is quiet or full of self-promotion. Nobody runs it and nothing happens there.	Start a project group with people I choose, add recommended members I vet myself, and offer one service together. *(Project groups, sections 13 and 21)*	Groups (more than 2 million in 2018) and Services pages

Project groups and mentors may bring the biggest gains. They are optional, and they don't require LinkedIn to hire community managers: members run them. Section 13 looks at why Groups have struggled, and section 22 explains how members could do better.

Three simple models show what support changes for a newcomer, what LinkedIn could earn when members succeed, and what a test should measure. The numbers are illustrative, not forecasts of LinkedIn's results.

CENTRAL THESIS

A professional network may build more durable revenue when more of its members develop useful skills, relationships, work, and income. A platform like LinkedIn could test that proposition by designing member progression and business economics together, and by measuring outcomes beyond attention.

WHERE I WOULD START

If I were LinkedIn, I would start with the changes that use tools it already has, beginning with asking members what they want and letting them choose whose updates they see. Those are cheap to test and easy to measure.

Project groups would come next, as a small test with members who choose to take part, compared with members invited later.

The measure is simple: are members better off, and is the platform earning because of it? Both have to be true.

Who This Case Study Is For

This case study is for people making decisions about how professional networks and communities work, and what success looks like for the people using them. The primary readers are **platform executives and product leaders** responsible for member experience, discovery, and long-term value, and **platform strategy and monetization leaders** balancing revenue with a healthy multi-sided market.

It is also written for **ecosystem strategists and community leaders** designing onboarding, participation, mentorship, and progression; **AI product and behavioral research specialists** working on recommendation systems, member intent, privacy, and outcome measurement; and **leaders of professional marketplaces and learning platforms** confronting comparable design problems.

I use LinkedIn as the case because it is the largest professional network and the one I know best, as a member and as someone who has built reputations and communities on it. The proposals describe what I would do in its position. Any network, marketplace, community platform, or company facing the same questions can adapt them, and section 31 describes how. Before anyone puts them into operation, the strongest critical review would come from a platform economist, a recommender-systems/product researcher, a community operations leader, and an expert in platform unit economics and experimentation.

WHAT THIS CASE STUDY IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT

This is an independent case study, shared freely. Its purpose is to make the real needs of members and customers visible, and to show a direction a platform could take to meet them.

It is not a finished product plan. It does not include final pricing, payment, tax, and legal requirements, detailed product specifications or user research, engineering estimates, or forecasts based on LinkedIn's internal data, which I do not have. Prices refer to LinkedIn's current public pricing, and numbers are illustrative. Each of these would need many rounds of work with a platform's own teams and data.

Introduction: The Professional Network at a Turning Point

From attention to intention

Every professional network has to decide what it is selling. LinkedIn has sold access to talent, subscriptions, and advertising, and the feed has made attention a growing part of that: members spend time in the feed, and the platform sells access to that time. On a professional network, attention has a second use. Recruiters, advertisers, and sales teams pay to reach people at the moment they might be ready to act.

AI makes that moment easier to predict. A system that reads what members click, search, and write can infer that someone is thinking about leaving a job, starting a business, or looking for clients, often before they have told anyone. That inference is valuable, and a platform could choose to sell it.

I think the better choice, for members and for the business, is to ask. When members state what they want and can see how the platform reads them, the platform can use those intentions to help them act, with their consent. The rest of this case study is about what that would take, starting with one member.

When the job ends

Consider Maria, an illustrative case. She has spent twenty years in operations at a logistics company, the person everyone calls when a supply chain breaks. Then her role is eliminated, and she decides to go independent and sell what she knows to smaller companies.

LinkedIn tells her to post more often and to pay for reach. To sell a paid advice session, she first needs a Premium Business subscription. Her profile still reads like her old job description, and the people she followed for years are buried between ads and posts from strangers.

What she needs is different: help putting what she is good at into words, a first offer people can book, a few people with complementary skills to work with, and a first client. LinkedIn already has

the people, the clients, and the tools to give her that. What is missing is a path from expertise to paid work, and that is what this case study proposes.

Why I'm writing this



I've spent my career on one question: why do some digital communities become extraordinarily valuable while others lose the people who made them work? I've seen members take on roles, help each other, and build things together. I've also seen a business with half a million members close because it could no longer afford to reach its own community.

This is an independent, practitioner-led case study. I draw on seventeen years of building communities, including professional poker communities, recruitment and career platforms, and coaching marketplaces, alongside LinkedIn's published research, product announcements, and limited observation of my own feed. The proposals describe what I would do if I were LinkedIn, and any network can adapt them.

What follows

Part I looks at how AI changes the value of knowledge. Part II sets out how healthy ecosystems work, drawing on communities I have built. Parts III and IV turn that into proposals for LinkedIn, starting with changes it could make with tools it already has and ending with project groups that let members win paid work together. Parts V to VII cover the economics, the pricing, and how to test them on a small scale.

PART I

The Changing Economics of Knowledge and Professional Work

1. Knowledge Sharing Built the First Generation of Professional Networks

What digital communities made possible

Before generative AI, accessing specialist information often required finding the right person, joining a professional community, attending an event, or working inside an organization that possessed the knowledge. Digital communities lowered those barriers. People could exchange experience, ask questions, discuss methods, and learn from professionals outside their immediate circles.

The resulting relationships also created work. People found colleagues, mentors, clients, employees, and partners. Professional networks grew because knowledge exchange and access to people were closely connected.

What AI changes

AI changes the cost and speed of retrieving and processing existing information. A professional can ask a system to compare business models, summarize research, explore an unfamiliar field, or assist with analysis. The system may be wrong, incomplete, or lack crucial context; human verification still matters. But routine access to much existing information is no longer as scarce as it once was.

Knowing is not doing

Knowing something is not the same as being able to do it. Knowing how to transform an organization does not make someone capable of leading the transformation. Knowing the principles of financial management does not establish sound judgment under pressure. Reading a technical explanation does not confer years of practical experience.

Professional ecosystems can respond by helping members use knowledge, develop relevant skills, demonstrate expertise, and solve problems.

2. Knowledge Sharing Was Only the Beginning

Consider an experienced executive, and what happens to their expertise in four stages.


Knowledge: The executive explains how they led an organizational transformation. AI can now retrieve and explain much of what has been written about transformations. What it lacks is the tacit knowledge the executive learned by doing and never wrote down, and that will take time.

Execution: A small team applies that knowledge to a client's problem. AI drafts the plan, analyzes the data, and builds the materials. People set the direction and handle what doesn't fit the pattern.

Ownership: Someone has to decide what to recommend, check what AI produced, keep the client's trust, and answer for the result. That stays with people.

Value: The client gets a result and pays for it. The team earns, builds a reputation, and finds the next project.

The balance between AI and people shifts across the four stages, but every stage still needs people, and the last two depend on them. When AI makes knowledge cheap, a network becomes valuable by helping members own outcomes and earn from them.



The balance shifts across the stages. Every stage still needs people, and the last two depend on them.

FIGURE 1 *From knowledge to value: what AI and people each bring*

The next generation of professional ecosystems can connect all four. Their measures of success can move beyond content consumption to useful relationships, skills practiced, projects delivered, services established, and opportunities created.

3. AI and the Reorganization of Work

Advanced AI can support research, writing, analysis, planning, coding, service design, and other professional tasks. Individuals and small teams can undertake some activities with fewer resources than previously required. Companies are deciding which work still needs permanent teams, and where human judgment has to stay in charge of AI.

This does not justify claiming that traditional employment will disappear. LinkedIn's June 2026 analysis of European and British labor markets identified macroeconomic conditions and uncertainty as major contributors to weak hiring, rather than a broad employment shock caused by AI. Technological change and macroeconomic conditions must be distinguished.

The organization of work is nevertheless open to change. People may move between employment, independent consulting, entrepreneurship, and project teams during the same career. Each arrangement requires different relationships, support, and professional infrastructure.

4. The Independent Expert Economy

LinkedIn's October 27, 2026 report found that "founder" was among the ten fastest-growing roles in five major economies during the third quarter of 2026. Four in ten surveyed professionals said AI made them more likely to start a business. Startups founded in 2024 employed 26% fewer people after one year than those founded in 2021, though the data does not establish that AI caused the difference.

That raises a practical question: what infrastructure will people need if more expertise is organized through independent businesses and smaller collaborating teams?

Experienced professionals may possess considerable expertise without knowing how to establish an independent public presence, validate a service, find customers, or coordinate work outside an employer. Professional networks are well positioned to support that transition because they already contain the people, relationships, experience, and market demand.

PART II

How Healthy Ecosystems Work

5. Members Create the Value, and Some Are Customers

The engine of the business

LinkedIn's greatest asset is its members: the specialists, employers, customers, community builders, and professionals whose expertise and relationships make the network useful. They create the participation that recruiters, advertisers, and companies value; some also purchase Premium and business tools themselves.

How the engine is treated

Yet the way the engine is treated does not match its value. Basic tools for selling services, such as Advice Sessions, sit behind a paid subscription. A third-party account tracker cited by Search Engine Journal (Jarboe, 2026) reported a 47% year-over-year organic-reach decline among the accounts it tracked; that is not a platform-wide measurement. LinkedIn has introduced some differentiated tools, but its basic auction-based promotion products do not inherently adjust their economics to a new independent member's available time, reputation, or budget. Model 1 in Part V shows what that does to the newcomer.

No path for new members

LinkedIn offers onboarding, help resources, career tools, and learning products. The unmet opportunity is a sustained, member-directed journey connecting profile clarity, skill development, professional discovery, collaboration, and work, including for members who rarely publish. The proposed Book of Success is an extension and integration of existing tools, not a claim that LinkedIn provides none.

Why it matters: a multi-sided market

A professional platform serves several interconnected groups. Recruiters need professionals; advertisers need credible audiences; businesses need customers and specialists; learners need

experienced practitioners; independent experts need opportunities. The value that one group creates supports demand from another.

Multi-sided platform economics shows why these relationships matter (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Economists call these cross-side network effects: the more one group participates, the more valuable the platform becomes to the others. A platform can benefit commercially from supporting members who do not immediately buy its products because their participation makes the system useful to other paying customers.

LinkedIn members contribute experience, relationships, information, and activity. LinkedIn supplies discovery, identity, learning, matching, and commercial infrastructure. Both sides depend on the relationship working. LinkedIn's commercial value depends on the professional value its members create for one another. A platform's revenue should therefore be evaluated alongside the health of the environment that creates commercial demand.

6. The City Analogy

To explain where LinkedIn's design falls short, it helps to think of the network as a city.

A city of toll roads

A city needs transport, public spaces, schools, markets, and services. Businesses and residents succeed because that infrastructure lets them reach one another. Imagine turning every road into a toll road, redirecting traffic chiefly toward paid commercial districts, and making local neighborhoods difficult to reach. Short-term revenue may rise while the city becomes less useful to its residents.

The network's infrastructure

A digital professional ecosystem has equivalent infrastructure. Connections and follows establish professional neighborhoods. The feed distributes activity. Communities provide meeting places. Learning tools develop skills. Marketplaces support commerce. Algorithms decide what becomes visible.

Commercial design must maintain the value of this infrastructure. Revenue extraction without a healthy participant environment risks weakening the markets that support the platform.

7. Lessons From the Communities I've Built

Balance at the table

I learned ecosystem design building professional poker communities. A poker ecosystem needs players at every level. When beginners only ever meet high-stakes players, they lose and leave, and the high-stakes players run out of people to play. The communities that lasted helped beginners learn and move up, until they were the ones teaching.

Bankroll management

Every player also needs a bankroll, and managing it is everything. A player who loses their bankroll early is out of the game, however talented they are. People building a business face the same problem: money and time can run out before their reputation is built.

The same lesson on professional networks

I later applied the same principles to skill-sharing ecosystems on recruitment and career platforms and coaching marketplaces. The setting was different, but the problem was the same: people at very different career levels need different things from the same network, and the network only works when each level has a way forward. On both platforms, as in any digital network, the people were almost never in the same place, so designing the network meant designing how they worked together through technology.

Professional networks face comparable imbalances. An established executive with a large audience has different resources from an experienced specialist developing a public presence for the first time. A corporation can afford campaigns that a new independent consultant cannot. A popular creator can dominate attention even when a less-visible professional has deeper expertise in a narrow field.

The aim is not to guarantee equal visibility regardless of merit. It is to recognize different forms of value and avoid creating an environment in which newcomers cannot find a viable route to participation.

8. A Practitioner Case: Matching People by Level and Specialty

People at different career levels need different kinds of help. On the recruitment and career platforms and coaching marketplaces I helped build, I saw what a network can do when it gives them that help. Two examples show how.

The recruitment platform

The recruitment platform connected women in technology with flexible jobs, and it ran a private community and network where members shared knowledge and skills. I helped develop that network alongside the platform's developers. A junior designer and a senior leader came to it for very different reasons, so members were grouped by specialty and career level, and each group got support for its specific career needs.

During the period when we provided stage-specific support, profile completion rose by 300%. This is practitioner-reported operational data and should not be interpreted as an isolated causal estimate. As part of onboarding, every member got free guidance on completing and strengthening their profile. We also offered a full profile revamp to the top 3% of members, because the scarcest talent often never gets around to it, and those are the people employers most want to find.

Who helps members stand out

LinkedIn now offers AI to help members write their profiles. AI can polish wording. It can't yet listen to someone describe what they actually did, and pick out the strengths that will matter to the people reading. That still takes one person talking to another, and even as AI improves, that conversation is worth keeping.

LinkedIn already has members who are very good at helping professionals tell their story. A network could build them into onboarding: free guidance on getting your profile right, followed by a clear path to the people who can help you go further. Premium, white-glove support can sit on top for those who want it. Every member should have a free path that works, and members who are ready to pay should be able to go straight to expert help.

The coaching marketplace

On the coaching marketplace, the coaches needed grouping as much as the members did. Candidates interviewing at big tech companies often faced both a technical evaluation and a soft-skills evaluation, and no single coach covered both. We paired technical experts with HR and soft-skills experts and offered each pairing as one service, so a candidate could prepare for the whole process with one team. Platform revenue grew 200% over that period; that observed business outcome cannot be attributed exclusively to the coaching-pairing intervention. When a larger organization later acquired the business, it applied the same approach to its own operations.

The lesson

The same holds for any network. One person rarely has every skill a project needs, and much of a network's value comes from putting the right combination together.

9. A Practitioner Case: Paying to Reach Your Own Community

In 2014, I worked on a play-for-fun gaming business with about 550,000 members on Facebook, which we also used for research. Players bought play-for-fun coins for small amounts, and the business had no other revenue.

When reach became something to buy

In those years, Facebook sharply reduced how many people saw posts from business Pages. An Ogilvy analysis found that average organic reach fell from about 16% of a Page's fans in 2012 to about 6% in February 2014, and to about 2% for Pages with more than 500,000 likes. In June 2014, Facebook explained that Pages were competing with far more content, and pointed businesses to paid ads.

Priced like a large brand

Because our audience was large, we were priced like a large brand. What it cost to reach our own members did not reflect what kind of business we were or how little each member spent. We could not pay what it cost to reach the community we had built, and eventually we closed.

The same pattern on LinkedIn

LinkedIn presents a comparable economic risk for some people who are starting out. A newly independent consultant can find themselves buying visibility in the same advertising auction environment as a global company with a marketing department. LinkedIn's advertising page says its $10 minimum daily budget lets "companies of any size" market themselves, and that each ad's cost is set by an auction. The page speaks to companies throughout, and its example of success on a modest budget comes from O'Reilly, an established international publisher. That advertising page does not describe an incubation path for an individual who has just started. Auction prices reflect bidding and ad performance rather than a guarantee of affordability for a professional at that stage. Our business had half a million members and still could not make the economics work. A solo consultant with a few hundred connections faces a different, often equally challenging, starting point.

The lesson

A large, engaged community does not make a business viable when the platform charges everyone the same for access to it. LinkedIn can learn from this. A new independent professional needs better free onboarding, and then a realistic way to pay for reach while their business is still small: a Premium Career plan that supports building independent work, with small, labeled reach to relevant new people, while access to updates from chosen relationships remains available without

buying a subscription. Once they are earning, they can afford well-targeted advertising aimed at their ideal customers. Part VI sets out how this could work.

10. The Cost of Becoming an Independent Business

A ramp for new businesses

An early-stage entrepreneur often pays expenses before revenue becomes predictable. Some software companies already price for this. HubSpot offers startups in its partner programs, such as Techstars, up to 90% off selected software in the first year, 50% in the second, and 25% in the third; AWS offers eligible startups promotional cloud credits (HubSpot for Startups, 2026; AWS Activate, 2026). One commercial rationale is that successful startups may become valuable long-term customers. In poker terms, this is bankroll management: a new business needs enough runway to last until its reputation starts paying.

Personal brands take time to build

One of LinkedIn's most attractive features is the chance to build a personal brand, for individuals and for businesses. But a company with an operating budget and an individual who is just starting out cannot be marketed to in the same way. Many individuals are new to the platform or have an underdeveloped personal brand. Some are not running a business yet. A platform needs to recognize these members and support them, and that support cannot be tied to immediate monetization. Its first job is to help them integrate into the network.

The same products for everyone

Digital advertising can create a comparable problem when platforms offer the same commercial products to every participant. The economics of a recently displaced professional launching a modest service differ from those of an established consultancy selling major engagements.

A sustainable platform can support early credibility, relationships, and commercial validation before a member purchases larger promotional services. In economic terms, this may be an investment in future demand.


DESIGN LOGIC

From Economic Change to Design Choices

Part I described what AI changes about professional work. Part II described what healthy ecosystems need. The proposals in the rest of this case study follow from both. Each one answers a specific point where members get stuck, and none of them depends on a particular feed percentage.

WHAT HAS CHANGED	WHERE MEMBERS GET STUCK	PROPOSED RESPONSE	SECTION
Knowledge is easier to retrieve	Experience is hard to show	Free profile guidance and the Book of Success	8, 19, 21
Careers move between jobs, consulting, and businesses	The platform misreads current goals	My Professional Priorities: stated, editable goals	14
Attention is plentiful and relevance is scarce	Chosen relationships are hard to reach	Member-controlled feed balance and explained discovery	15, 16
Value comes from applying expertise	A specialist lacks collaborators or early clients	Project groups, work samples, and matching	21, 22
New businesses start with little money	Paying for reach before the offer is proven	Premium Career for independent work, and fees on completed bookings	27

The chain this case study tests runs in one direction. A member states a goal, gets relevant support, shows a skill or builds a useful relationship, and reaches work or another outcome they value. If enough members get there, the platform's economics get stronger. Each link can be measured, and section 29 describes how.



Members decide and AI supports each stage. What members achieve informs the next cycle.

FIGURE 2 *Four connected ecosystem decisions*

The 60/20/up-to-20 feed mix in section 15 is a starting point for an experiment, not a required ratio. Relationship content, discovery, and sponsored content each need their own evaluation, with member choice and the supply of relevant posts respected.

PART III

LinkedIn as the Principal Case Study

11. Why LinkedIn

Microsoft reported LinkedIn revenue of $19.817 billion in fiscal 2026 (FY2026 Form 10-K). LinkedIn reported a registered member base exceeding 1.4 billion in October 2026 (LinkedIn, October 27–28, 2026). Its commercial products connect recruiters, advertisers, sales organizations, businesses, and professionals. Its learning, identity, and AI infrastructure make it a strong case for examining how professional ecosystems might evolve.

The analysis uses public documentation and practitioner observation. It makes no claim to LinkedIn's unpublished feed distribution figures, internal model weights, member data, or customer margins. LinkedIn may have good reasons, invisible from outside, for the choices it has made. The proposals here are what I would do with the information that is public.

12. Members Have Invested in Relationships

Years of deliberate choices

Members spend years deciding whom to connect with, whom to follow, whose work they trust, and which communities they want to join. These decisions represent a valuable investment.

My own experience illustrates the point. LinkedIn has produced projects, business relationships, learning, and friendships for me. I've deliberately followed some professionals and unfollowed others. My interests cross leadership, AI, organizational design, economics, community building, and human behavior. They cannot be reduced to a single professional label.

What my feed showed

In late October 2026, I manually collected three snapshots of my own LinkedIn feed and used AI to help classify the posts. In one 84-post sample of the default "Most Relevant" feed, 14 were from

people I recognized, about 22% were ads, and roughly one-third concerned AI. These categories are descriptive and can overlap; "people I know" is not equivalent to all accounts I follow.

In a separate 112-post snapshot of "Most Recent," 23 came from people I recognized, 48 were content surfaced through connections' interactions with other accounts, and 19 were ads. In a third 79-post morning snapshot, 18 came from first-degree connections and 14 were ads. The observations use slightly different relationship definitions, were not independently coded, and were not drawn from a standardized sampling frame.

These are small, nonrandom observations of one member's feed, not evidence of LinkedIn-wide distribution or causality. They nevertheless make an important design question concrete: how easily can a member reliably access the people they deliberately chose to follow?

What the algorithm misses

An algorithm may infer that someone wants more AI content because they read several AI-related posts. The person may actually want more thoughtful organizational analysis from specific people they know. Their deliberate relationships and stated goals should influence how the platform interprets their behavior.

Members built much of the value LinkedIn now monetizes, from the relationships to the reputations, and that makes it value the platform is responsible for protecting. If a platform makes members dependent on paid distribution to reach their chosen network, it risks weakening the relationships on which its business depends. The claim is a strategic risk to test, not a demonstrated causal explanation for any member's reach.

13. What LinkedIn Has Already Built

The feed, from 2019 to 2026

LinkedIn's June 2019 engineering publication reported that, in its then-described feed candidate-generation system, more than 80% of feed updates came from FollowFeed and those updates generated more than 95% of member conversations. These are 2019 figures, not a measure of today's feed.

In March 2026, LinkedIn described an LLM-powered retrieval and ranking architecture to interpret post meaning and member interests. That month, it also announced testing an Interest Picker at signup for new members. In August, LinkedIn described redesigned LLM-based follow recommendations intended to identify relevant creators beyond popularity signals.

New tools for independent professionals

On October 15, 2026, LinkedIn announced a test of a dedicated Network feed for connections and followed accounts. It also announced products supporting independent professionals, including Advice Sessions and tools for people developing side businesses. Advice Sessions require a Premium Business subscription. A newly independent professional pays before earning anything from the feature, which is the bankroll problem described earlier in the section on the cost of becoming an independent business.

Fighting low-quality content

In July 2026, LinkedIn introduced a "Seems like AI slop" reporting option. Subsequent third-party reports stated that the option was used over a million times and that content LinkedIn identified as AI slop had 40% fewer views. Those reported figures are not an independent causal evaluation of the reporting feature.

Groups, rebuilt more than once

LinkedIn has had Groups for most of its history. In October 2015 it made all groups private and moved them into a separate app, partly to fight spam. Activity fell, critics called groups ghost towns, and LinkedIn withdrew the app in February 2018. In August 2018 Groups returned to the main app with threaded replies, pinned posts, and admin tools, and LinkedIn reported more than 2 million groups. In February 2019 it announced notifications and post approval, and said engagement in groups had more than doubled since the relaunch.

Each rebuild added features. What Groups still lack is community management: people running groups with the tools, training, and incentives to make them work. Without them, self-promotion fills the space, and the people running groups spend their time removing it. Groups also offer little beyond posting and commenting. Members can share knowledge, but there is no way to come together on a project, collaborate, or learn from each other. I saw these limits as a senior partner in Remote Workers Worldwide, one of LinkedIn's largest groups on remote work.

This is my reading of the public record and my own experience, not an inside account of LinkedIn's decisions. It suggests that Groups may be one of LinkedIn's largest unused assets: communities already organized around specialties, more than 2 million of them by 2018, without the community management that would let them create value for members and revenue for the platform.

Where the framework builds on this

These are meaningful steps and should be acknowledged. The proposed framework builds on them. Its additional contribution is a continuous member-directed system connecting stated goals, feed preference controls, expertise development, collaboration, and measurable professional outcomes.

FEATURE PROPOSAL

14. My Professional Priorities

14.1 The problem

Recommendation systems are good at observing behavior. They are less reliable at understanding why an action occurred. Someone may read material they disagree with, research a topic temporarily, or react to a friend's work as a social gesture. An inferred interest can become self-reinforcing when the system keeps offering similar material.

The platform can reduce that ambiguity by asking members what they want, and treating the answers as voluntary, editable evidence rather than permanent labels.

> *Design principle: Stop making the recommendation system guess when the member can tell it directly.*

14.2 Member-facing experience


The feature is called My Professional Priorities. It is a voluntary, editable set of preferences linked to feed recommendations, professional discovery, learning, and relevant opportunities.

The first prompt is simple: **What matters most to you professionally right now?**

Members can select several topics, people, skills, industries, or types of opportunities. They can also describe their priorities in their own words. Example:

> *"I'm interested in how experienced professionals are building independent businesses with AI, and I'd like to meet consultants working on complementary services. I still want to see what the people I follow are doing."*

An LLM helps translate the statement into suggested preference categories. The system shows its interpretation and asks the member to confirm or correct it. The original text is never treated as unquestionable ground truth, and declining the prompt should not reduce access to basic functionality.



Illustrative concept for discussion. Not a LinkedIn product or interface.

FIGURE 3 *Concept screen for My Professional Priorities*

A second prompt asks: **What are you trying to accomplish?** Possible objectives include learning a new skill, finding a job, developing a service, discovering experts, hiring, meeting collaborators, finding clients, developing a community, or following trusted professional voices.

A third prompt asks: **Whose updates matter most to you?** Members can prioritize people they follow, first-degree connections, specialist communities, or selected experts. They can pin or protect a small group of people whose updates they want to be shown when eligible content is available.

A fourth prompt asks: **How do you want your professional feed balanced?** The member can select a relationship-first, balanced, or discovery-first preset, or adjust the balance between chosen-network content and professional discovery. The availability of eligible content, not an artificial quota, controls whether the system can fulfill the preference. Sponsored content is clearly labeled and governed by separate advertising rules; it is not silently presented as a personal preference.

A member short on time could also say, "I've got five minutes. Show me what's worth knowing," and get a short, finished feed: a few posts from people they chose, one strong contribution from outside their network, and one relevant opportunity. If nothing useful is available, the feed should end there instead of filling the space.

14.3 Ongoing survey rather than one-time onboarding

This feature must remain useful after signup. Career priorities change. A member may move from finding a job to building a consultancy, or from researching AI tools to forming a specialist team.

The platform periodically asks a short question rather than requiring an extensive new survey: **Are these still your priorities?**

The member can confirm, revise, pause, or clear them. A gentle review every 60–90 days is a testable starting hypothesis, not a compulsory schedule. Members can change preferences at any time. Prompts should respect dismissal and avoid disrupting normal feed use.

A useful test is to ask one optional question when a member voluntarily signals a change, rather than sending them through an extensive settings process:

- **Open to Work:** when a member chooses to turn it on, "Want your feed to focus on roles and recruiters in your field for now?" This must not imply financial distress.
- **A first Services page:** when a member publishes an offer, "Who is your ideal client?" Their answer can improve optional professional discovery, subject to privacy and advertising safeguards.
- **Too much noise:** when a member mutes a trending topic, "Want to see only the people and communities you chose to follow?"
- **A possible new direction:** after repeated reading about independent work, a member might optionally be asked, "Are you exploring independent work?" This trigger needs special restraint: reading can mean research or disagreement, and the system should avoid sensitive career inferences unless the member chooses to confirm them.

14.4 Human feedback after recommendations

Members should be able to explain why a recommendation is useful or unhelpful, using compact responses:

- Relevant to my goals
- I follow this person for a reason
- Useful expert, wrong topic
- Too repetitive

- Not useful right now
- Show me more of this type of opportunity

The platform can occasionally ask a second question: **Did this recommendation help you do something?** Possible outcomes include learning, contacting someone, finding a collaborator, joining a project, or discovering a client opportunity. Members should not be pressured to share confidential outcomes.

14.5 How the AI system uses the answers

The model combines three families of information:

Declared intent: what the member says they want, including confirmed professional goals, topics, relationships, and preferences.

Observed behavior: relevant activity, with safeguards against interpreting every click as endorsement.

Evaluated usefulness: explicit feedback and, when voluntarily supplied, practical outcomes.

An LLM interprets free-text goals into understandable concepts. Retrieval systems find candidate posts, experts, learning activities, and opportunities. Ranking systems evaluate their relevance while protecting deliberate member relationships, variety, freshness, trust, and discovery.

An explanation interface can show why certain content was recommended: “You asked for independent consulting opportunities” or “From a professional you follow.” Members can correct the system’s interpretation in one action.




FIGURE 4 *The member-directed recommendation loop*

14.6 Business and research value

The feature creates a direct feedback loop between member intent and platform performance. Instead of asking whether the person clicked, the organization can also test whether recommendations matched declared objectives and produced useful outcomes.

It may help reduce irrelevant feed repetition, protect chosen relationships, improve discovery for less-visible specialists, and increase the value of platform time for busy professionals. It must be tested experimentally.

14.7 Privacy and safeguards

The feature should be voluntary; members retain visibility and edit control over their answers. Sensitive attributes and inferred vulnerabilities must not be repurposed from free-text goals for advertising or consequential ranking without a valid legal basis and appropriate safeguards; the safer default is to exclude them. Sensitive content should be excluded or handled under appropriate legal bases and safeguards. Data collection, retention, model training, and optional sharing require clear explanations. Members should be able to opt out of outcome questions and remove their saved priorities.

This is the line between serving members' intentions and harvesting them. Goals a member states to get better recommendations should not quietly become advertising targets.

14.8 What distinguishes this proposal from current LinkedIn tools

LinkedIn's 2026 signup Interest Picker helps some new members select topics. Its Network feed test gives access to chosen relationships. Its "Seems like AI slop" option lets members flag low-quality posts.

My Professional Priorities combines and extends these ideas: continuing goal surveys for established members, natural-language intent, member-confirmed interpretation, control over relationship versus discovery priorities, feedback on recommendation usefulness, and evaluation against professional outcomes.


FEATURE PROPOSAL

15. Member-Controlled Feed Allocation

A starting point for testing

One hypothetical starting allocation for a controlled experiment is:

- 60% content from people, organizations, and communities the member follows.
- 20% relevant professional discovery.
- Up to 20% clearly identified sponsored content.



The 60 / 20 / up-to-20 mix is a starting point for an experiment, not a quota or LinkedIn policy. Names are fictional.

FIGURE 5 *Concept screen for member-controlled feed balance*

This is a starting point for testing, not a rule. My own count earlier in this case study came out far from it: people I know made up about 17% of my default feed and about 21% of "Most Recent," and ads made up about 22% and 17%.

I applied this balance as a design principle in the skill-sharing communities I built, so members got the most value from what they saw. It also has a precedent outside them. The EU's Audiovisual Media Services Directive provides a separate precedent for advertising limits in television, with a 20% maximum across specified time windows. It does not apply the same rule to LinkedIn's feed. Long-term evidence suggests that heavier ad loads can cost platforms more than short tests reveal (Goli et al., 2025). In a 21-month field experiment on Pandora, listeners who heard more ads listened less, and the effect was three times larger than a one-month test would have found. Google cut the ad load on its mobile search by 50% after finding that the quality of ads users had already seen shaped how they responded to ads later. None of this establishes the right level for a professional network. The 60/20/up-to-20 allocation is an experiment to test member choice, relevant discovery, and the long-term economics of sponsored content.

Supply and quality

The feed must also account for eligible supply and quality: if fewer relevant network posts or ads exist, the system should not manufacture poor results simply to fill a quota. Different member groups may choose different relationship/discovery settings. Advertising controls must be governed separately from editorial recommendations.

Member choice comes first

The more important principle is member choice. The user should be able to say, "I want to hear from the people I deliberately follow," or, "I'm trying to meet new professionals this month." The system should respect that choice rather than override it only because another post predicts higher engagement.

FEATURE PROPOSAL

16. Explainable Professional Discovery

Professional discovery should reach beyond accounts with established audiences. If a less-visible specialist has skills matching a member's declared interests, they can be considered for recommendation on their professional relevance, evidence, and suitability.

Recommendations should distinguish content discovery, expert discovery, skill-development opportunities, team formation, and commercial services. A person may want to find a qualified collaborator without subscribing to that person's content. These are different user intentions and should be treated separately.

A short explanation helps trust: "Relevant because you are building a service in organizational design" or "Specialist expertise matches your project interests." The member can confirm, refine, or dismiss the explanation.

17. Measuring Outcomes Beyond Engagement

LinkedIn reported over 16% year-over-year growth in feed content views and over 15% growth in time spent engaging in October 2026. Such figures indicate activity. They do not, on their own, establish better professional outcomes.

In the same update, LinkedIn reported 63% year-over-year growth in creator-led ads and 13% growth in established creators posting daily. These figures show commercial activity around creators; they do not establish that ordinary members lost impressions because of that activity. My own feed observations raise a different question: how much of the network members choose becomes useful and discoverable to them?

A mature ecosystem can measure: relevant relationships formed, skills developed, applied projects completed, useful introductions, independent services validated, clients acquired, job outcomes, member satisfaction, and the time participants needed to accomplish those goals.

LinkedIn serves a different purpose from entertainment platforms like TikTok. Its members often come with limited time and something to get done. For an executive with ten minutes between meetings, one useful connection may matter more than a longer feed session. The objective is to understand whether the platform helped the member make productive use of their time.

The question for LinkedIn's product leadership is how to test whether new recommendation systems improve relevant relationships, opportunities, and member trust alongside content engagement. The technology is available. The question is what LinkedIn chooses to optimize for.

18. Connecting Existing LinkedIn Tools

LinkedIn has profiles, learning tools, Service Pages, hiring products, Sales Navigator, advice products, collaborative posts, and AI recommendation systems. The strategic opportunity is to connect these tools through a deliberate member journey.

A member could establish a role, build a skill, practice it, demonstrate the result, discover collaborators, and become visible for appropriate work. As their business develops, more advanced commercial services may become suitable. The proposed ecosystem would support progression between these activities, not require every member to be a public content creator.

The LinkedIn operating model: how the proposals connect

The proposals in this study are one system, not a wish list of independent features. Each part addresses a predictable point at which a member may lose momentum. LinkedIn can test them together while using its existing profiles, feeds, learning tools, Services pages, and commercial products.

LAYER	MEMBER NEED	PROPOSED LINKEDIN RESPONSE	EVIDENCE OF USEFULNESS
Identity and journey	"Understand what I can offer."	Guided profile, member-selected role and career stage, the Book of Success	Clearer profiles, validated service propositions, member confidence
Intent and discovery	"Show me people and work relevant to my goal."	My Professional Priorities, chosen-network controls, explainable discovery	Member-rated relevance, useful introductions, fewer unwanted repeats
Participation and progression	"Help me practice, contribute, and work with others."	Project groups, collaboration matching, optional mentors	Skills practiced, projects started, reciprocal relationships, movement between stages
Sustainable commercial participation	"Let me earn before I have to spend heavily."	Free foundational access, Premium Career for those ready to pay, transaction-based fees, advanced paid tools as relevant	Verified bookings where consented, retained members, net revenue after program costs

Human–AI division of work. AI can interpret optional member goals, retrieve opportunities, suggest matches, and flag patterns at volume. People establish the goals, contribute the work, choose whether to participate, assess context, and review consequential decisions. Members who lead project groups provide support, and what they see shows the product team where members get stuck. A system that recognizes expertise only through posting frequency would miss much of the value LinkedIn is positioned to organize.

Design constraint. Basic access to relationships members deliberately choose must not become a paid entitlement. Paid distribution is separately labeled and subject to recipient choice, quality standards, and advertising limits. The path to earned visibility should remain available to members who never buy promotion.

PART IV

The Human–AI Ecosystem Design Framework

The framework asks four connected questions within LinkedIn: who is in the ecosystem, what members say they want compared with the signals their behavior gives, how they move forward, and how the economics support that progress. The Design Logic section and section 18 show how the proposals connect. Part III examined intent and discovery, this part focuses on member journeys and skill progression, and Part VI examines commercial participation.

On a network, Human–AI means two things. First, AI and people share the work of running the ecosystem. AI ranks the feed, suggests whom to follow, estimates expertise, and matches people at a scale no team could. People supply what AI cannot yet do well: members state their own goals, and members who lead groups and profile experts bring judgment and storytelling. The design question is which jobs go to which side, and how each checks the other. Second, members already work in a Human–AI economy outside the platform. AI has made knowledge cheap, so what they need from a network is help putting it to work.

The mechanism that connects them

The four decisions describe a member's path. What turns that path into economic activity is the step between them: bringing complementary people, AI, and client demand together, so that projects get delivered and paid for. A platform does this in four moves.

1. **It recognizes what each member can do,** from their stated goals, their evidence, and what peers say about them.
2. **It learns what members want and what clients need,** from stated priorities on one side and project requests on the other.
3. **It helps members form teams whose skills complete each other.** Members invite the people they choose, the platform recommends who is missing, and AI handles research, drafting, and coordination while people make the calls.

4. **It records the result and pays the people who did it,** and takes a disclosed share. The verified project then makes the next match easier.

Without this step, a professional network is a better place to meet people. With it, the network becomes a place where people create income together, and the platform earns because they do. The worked example in section 21 follows one group through all four moves.

19. Identifying Member Journeys

A professional network holds people who create different kinds of value. A specialist, a mentor, an independent consultant, and someone who leads projects should not all be measured by the same popularity signals, and one person can be several of these at once.

LinkedIn already collects pieces of this. A profile can show skills, endorsements, a Services page, and Open to Work. Posting and engagement supply prominent signals, but valuable work conducted off-platform or without regular publishing can be harder for recommendation systems to assess. LinkedIn also uses other signals in search and recommendations, as its engineering publications describe. A cybersecurity specialist who never posts is hard for the platform to see, however good she is.

A member's stage can't be read from one signal. Being new to the platform, or posting often, says little on its own. The journey shows in a combination of factors: the goals the member states in My Professional Priorities, their career situation (employed, between roles, or newly independent), their experience, the evidence of what they can do, the network they have built, and whether they are earning from their work yet. AI can help interpret these signals at high volume, but a member must be able to inspect, edit, or challenge a consequential classification. Sparse evidence must not be treated as low expertise.

Once the journey is clear, LinkedIn can respond to it. A specialist with a strong track record could be shown to recruiters and project teams in her field even with a small audience. An experienced professional who has just gone independent would get onboarding, profile help, and a Premium Career plan built for independent work, as Part VI describes, instead of the same ad products a large company buys. Members who lead project groups can do much of what community managers did in the communities I built, as section 22 describes.

Levels, not a popularity ladder

In poker, members moved up through ranks and leagues, and every level came with its own support. A professional network needs the same, with two differences. Levels have to exist for different kinds of contribution, so a world-class specialist who rarely posts, a skilled community organizer, and a

successful independent consultant can each progress without being forced into one popularity ladder. And a level should open opportunities, never fix someone's worth.

- **Starting out:** free onboarding, the first chapter of the Book of Success, help getting the profile right, and Premium Career for those ready to pay.
- **Advancing:** earned reach to a first relevant audience, project groups, and selling services with a fee on each booking.
- **Scaling:** being shown to recruiters and project teams, invitations to mentor or teach, white-glove support, and the full advertising products.

Each level is also a different customer for LinkedIn, which is why pricing has to follow the level, as section 27 describes.

Getting found starts with the profile

Today, much of how professionals get found on LinkedIn comes down to recruiter search. It used to run on keywords and filters, and AI-assisted search now reads profiles for meaning as well as words. Either way, it reads what members have written about themselves, so clearer, complete profiles may be easier to match to opportunities. Professionals with deeper expertise but thinner profiles can be less legible to automated systems; this is a design risk, not a LinkedIn-wide measured outcome.

That makes profile support one of the most useful things a network can offer, and it matters in different ways for different members. An independent consultant needs a profile that makes customers want to talk to her. Someone looking for a job needs one that recruiters can find and trust. Right now, everyone works it out alone. LinkedIn's AI writing suggestions can only work with what the member gives them, and without a real conversation the result is generic.

LinkedIn could build this into the network itself. Every member would get a free, guided way to do it themselves, set up as a short learning experience with clear steps. Members who want more could work with the people on the network who are good at this, described in section 8. That creates value on both sides: members who need help get it, and members who offer it gain clients.

Recognition based on evidence

Recognition should also come from what a member has done: completed work, references, and assessments from peers who know the field. A member should be able to see how LinkedIn understands their journey, what evidence it used, and what opportunities follow, and correct it if it is wrong. Those opportunities, such as being shown to the right recruiters, invitations to mentor, or places on project teams, should not depend on buying promotion.

Once a member has shown relevant work through reviewed samples and peer feedback, LinkedIn could test showing it to a first pool of up to 3,000 relevant professionals, with published criteria that members can appeal. Posting less often must not be mistaken for knowing less.

20. Reading Member Journeys With AI

AI can combine the signals described in section 19 across the whole network: the goals members state, their experience, completed projects, the evidence they add themselves, and assessments from peers. It can also say how sure it is. A specialist who rarely posts leaves little public evidence, and the system should treat that as missing information, not as a low score.

The starting point is to define what valuable participation looks like, and then design the measurement around it. I have been doing this since 2009, and the criteria have stayed much the same: whether someone contributes consistently, whether their interactions go both ways, whether they share useful knowledge, whether they help others and work with them, and whether they are growing as a participant. AI makes these patterns far easier to see, at a scale no team could manage by hand.

One useful signal is whether a member's messages get answered. Reply rates are a possible signal of whether an introduction is welcome, but they are highly ambiguous: recipients can be busy or inactive, and different fields have different norms. They must not independently determine expertise or sanctions. Any use of aggregate messaging metadata needs clear notice, privacy review, bias testing, anti-gaming protections, and avenues to challenge material decisions. Not reading message content does not eliminate privacy concerns.

Popularity alone should never decide what a member is offered, and an assessment should open opportunities, never fix a permanent ranking of someone's worth. Members should be able to see and correct how they are assessed, and a person should review any decision that affects someone's opportunities.

FEATURE PROPOSAL


21. The Book of Success

Every community I've built had a Book of Success: an invitation into the network and a clear guide to how people do well there. In poker, members moved up through ranks and leagues, and each level came with guidance on how to reach the next. On LinkedIn today, the closest thing is advice to post regularly, use a good hook, or break a post into three sections. That isn't what makes someone successful on a professional network.

The first three steps

AI can support many routine professional tasks, so the Book of Success starts with the expertise, judgment, and relationships that make each member valuable. For a newly independent professional, it replaces the empty feed with three first steps. Every step works for free, and members who are ready to pay can book expert help at any point.

1. **Find what is unique in you.** A guided conversation asks the questions that matter: What is the hardest problem you consistently solve? On which decisions do people trust your judgment? AI can draw out the answers, and the profile experts described in section 8 can help turn them into a story.
2. **Package the offer.** The profile moves from a former job title to the outcome the member delivers for clients, and the member sets up a first offer people can book, such as an audit or a strategy session. That is the foundation for a profile that gets found, as section 19 describes.
3. **Start or join a project group.** A member launches a group around a service they want to offer and invites the people they choose. If a skill is missing, LinkedIn recommends members who have it, and the founder vets them first. The group offers one service on a shared Services page, takes bookings together, and builds a shared rating, like a small business made of LinkedIn members. Members can leave or start another group at any time.




Illustrative concept for discussion. Not a LinkedIn product or interface.

FIGURE 6 *Concept screen for the Book of Success*

From a group to paid work

This is the step where connections turn into income. Here is how it could look for one project group, followed through one client engagement. The people and numbers are illustrative. The pattern is the one I saw on the coaching marketplace, where pairing a technical expert with a soft-skills expert turned two partial services into one that candidates were willing to pay for.

1. **The group forms.** A fractional marketing lead who serves early-stage fintech founders launches a project group. She invites a copywriter she already knows, and adds a web developer LinkedIn recommends after checking his work herself.
2. **A client finds them.** A fintech founder preparing a product launch needs positioning, a landing page, and a first campaign. No single freelancer covers all of it. The founder finds the group's shared Services page and requests a proposal, which LinkedIn already allows for individual providers.
3. **They agree one offer.** Before anything is sent, they settle a fixed price of $9,000 paid in three stages, who leads the client relationship, and how the fee is split, and they record it on the platform. AI drafts the proposal and timeline from their notes. The people decide the price and scope, and book a mentor to review the proposal.
4. **They deliver together.** AI researches the market, drafts copy variations, and keeps the shared plan current. The people make the calls: which positioning fits this founder, what to cut, and how to handle feedback.
5. **They get paid, and it leads to more.** The client pays each stage through LinkedIn as it is delivered. LinkedIn takes a disclosed fee, and the rest is split as agreed. Each member's profile records a verified project. The founder asks for ongoing content, and the copywriter takes a monthly retainer.



Illustrative. Copywriter, web developer, and fractional marketing lead serving early-stage fintech founders.

FIGURE 7 *One client engagement, step by step*

No single member could have won this client alone. Knowledge sharing gave them expertise, and working as a group turned it into income. A network that works this way develops its future advertisers, instead of asking people who are struggling to buy visibility they can't afford.

It is also what Model 2 assumes. Model 2 counts $600 a year in fees for each member who transacts. At an illustrative 5% fee, that is $12,000 a year in bookings, roughly one engagement like this one plus some smaller work. Whether members reach that level is exactly what a test would measure.

What this would require. The example assumes things LinkedIn does not offer today: booking a group rather than one person, splitting a payment between several members, a shared rating, recording a verified project, and resolving disputes between a client and a group. Services pages and Advice Sessions are a starting point, but these would be new marketplace infrastructure, with the payments, tax, and governance work that comes with it.

When a group gets it wrong

People are messy. Scope creeps, a member delivers late, a client is unhappy and wants money back. The design has to expect this, so that disputes stay small and rarely reach LinkedIn.

- **Pay in stages.** Clients pay each milestone through an existing payment provider, and money is released when that stage is delivered. If a project breaks down halfway, only the current stage is in dispute, not the whole $9,000.

- **Agree before starting.** Scope, price, fee split, and who leads the client are recorded on the platform before the proposal goes out. Most later arguments become a matter of checking what was agreed.
- **Share the reputation of the people you invite.** Whoever invites a member into a group shares part of that member's rating. If the developer you vetted fails to deliver, it shows on your record too, so people vet seriously.
- **The group settles first.** Disputes go to the group, and only those it cannot settle reach LinkedIn's existing support and trust and safety teams.

Where projects come from

A project group without clients is a networking club, so demand has to come first. Clients can already request proposals through LinkedIn's Services pages, and those requests could reach a group when one person cannot cover the brief. Members bring their own clients, and a client who needs more than one member can deliver becomes a project for the group. Companies post contract and fractional work that a group could take on, and employers or partners could sponsor real briefs as paid projects. A test should start in a field where client requests already exist, and measure how many each group receives.

Project groups are the most ambitious part of this proposal. They fit community platforms best, and LinkedIn could adopt them if it wants to make more of Groups.

Mentors, when a group needs one

Mentors are invited for what they do for others: comments that solve problems, answers to people outside their circle, and work they have delivered with others. Groups book them when they need a second view, usually from an adjacent field, such as a senior UX researcher reviewing an early product team's plan. Mentoring has to serve the mentor too. It builds relationships that often lead to future work, and a visible credential that tells buyers and recruiters they can develop others. Whether a mentor helps is measured by what happens to the groups they support.

Who else this serves

The same path works beyond newly independent professionals. Someone who has lost a job after years inside an organization can use the first two steps to see what makes them valuable outside it. The invitation could be offered when they turn on Open to Work, as a choice they can ignore, and turning it on says nothing about anyone's finances. A graduate invited into a project group gets real experience on a client problem and leaves with a verified project. A career changer can join a group in the new field and book a mentor from it. Employers, universities, and learning partners could sponsor places, with clear rules that protect early-career members from unpaid work presented as experience.

22. Community Management, Done by Members

Everything in Part III works without community managers, and so do project groups. LinkedIn doesn't need to hire a community team. It needs to make community management possible for the members who lead project groups.


What made communities work

In the communities I've built, from poker to recruitment and coaching, community managers made the difference. They welcomed people, kept conversations useful, connected people who should know each other, and told the product team what members needed. Groups on LinkedIn have never had that, and staff numbers were never the reason. The people running groups have had no tools, no training, and no incentive to do it well.

What LinkedIn would provide

Members who lead project groups need tools to run them: invitations, recommendations for missing skills, shared bookings, and an easy way to remove self-promotion. They need training, which the Book of Success can provide. And they need a reason to do it well: groups that are run well win more clients, build a stronger shared rating, and become easier to find.

LinkedIn already has Client Solutions Managers, whose job is to help advertisers get results from their campaigns. Members could get the same kind of help, but it doesn't have to start with staff. Members who lead project groups well are already doing that job, and the platform can make it worth their while.



Members run project groups and pay for the help they book. Staff handle only the decisions that need a person.

FIGURE 8 *Who helps with what*

Staff are needed in one place: reviewing mentors, handling complaints and the disputes a group cannot settle itself, and protecting members. LinkedIn's existing trust and safety and support teams could do this with clear rules.

Mentor quality and member safety

An automated score should not decide who gets human attention. On a professional network, that would recreate the problem this case study is about: people with small audiences and deep expertise would be filtered out before anyone looked at their work. AI can help find possible mentors and spot patterns in participation, but people decide who mentors, and people decide what happens when something goes wrong.



FIGURE 9 *How mentors are invited, prepared, and held accountable*

Build or enable

LinkedIn could still hire community managers itself, with full control and full cost. If I were LinkedIn, I would enable members first, and build only if a test shows that staff deliver results members can't.

Many experts already get found on LinkedIn and then run their paid groups and programs on other platforms. If LinkedIn doesn't organize this support, smaller platforms will.

PART V

Economic Models

WHAT THIS PART SHOWS

The main point is simple. Members who get support and visibility should win clients sooner and earn more, and a test can measure whether they do. This part shows why that matters to LinkedIn, using three simple models with illustrative numbers rather than LinkedIn data.

Model 1: what support changes. Two people sell the same $750 service and each spends $400 on ads. People already trust the established consultancy, so on average its ads win it a client. The newcomer, whom nobody knows yet, would need about $1,600 of ads to win one, which is how promising people run out of money. If support doubles how often the newcomer's ads turn into clients, that cost halves to $800.

Model 2: what LinkedIn earns when members succeed. One newcomer who gives up is worth $400 to LinkedIn; one who succeeds is worth about $4,500 over three years. Across 10,000 newcomers, supporting them brings in about $560,000 more than doing nothing, even after counting the members who move to a cheaper plan.

Model 3: how to track it. The numbers a test would measure to find out for real.

23. Model Design Principles

The models below show how the framework can be tested. They are not claims about LinkedIn's internal systems, member conversion rates, costs, or margins. Every unstated rate is an illustrative assumption; the arithmetic is shown so that teams can replace the inputs with measured data. The models use revenue and explicit program costs for simplicity, not a complete profit-and-loss account. Any paid-media revenue would need to be converted into contribution margin before an investment decision. Applying them requires a platform's own data and experiments.


24. Model 1: What Support Changes

Customer acquisition cost (CAC) = advertising cost / customers acquired. In an expectation-based comparison, expected CAC = cost per click / conversion probability. Neither formula guarantees that a particular campaign will produce a sale.

Consider three people, each selling a $750 engagement and each buying 100 clicks at $4: a newcomer, the same newcomer after support, and an established consultancy. Support here means a clear offer, a profile that tells their story, verified work, and a project group behind them. The conversion rates are deliberately hypothetical, not LinkedIn benchmarks.

Where these rates come from. A click is not a client. Someone clicks, a small share leave their details or ask for a call, and only some of those buy. Published benchmarks give a sense of scale: LinkedIn ad clicks that turn into leads average around 6% for U.S. advertisers (HubSpot, 2020), professional-services websites turn about 6–9% of visits into leads (Ruler Analytics), and in one large analysis of CRM data only about 5% of website leads became closed deals (Implisit, 2014, as reported by Cirrus Insight, 2026). Multiplied together, that puts click-to-client for a typical advertiser at roughly 0.3–0.5%. A trusted, established firm with referrals and a clear offer does better, so the consultancy is set at 1%. A newcomer nobody knows yet does worse, so the starting rate is 0.25%. These sources are general benchmarks, not LinkedIn data, and some are several years old.

MEASURE	NEWCOMER	SUPPORTED NEWCOMER	ESTABLISHED CONSULTANCY
Offer price	$750	$750	$750
Advertising spend (100 clicks × $4)	$400	$400	$400
Assumed click-to-customer conversion	0.25%	0.50%	1.00%
Expected customers from 100 clicks	0.25	0.50	1.00
Expected gross sales value	$187.50	$375	$750
Expected sales less ad spend	−$212.50	−$25	+$350
Expected acquisition cost per customer	$1,600	$800	$400



Hypothetical conversion rates: 0.25%, 0.50% with support, and 1.00% for the established consultancy. Not LinkedIn benchmarks.

FIGURE 10 *What a client costs to win, before and after support*

An expected value of 0.25 customers means one customer per 400 clicks on average across many comparable campaigns, not a fraction of an actual buyer and not a promise that spending $1,600 secures a sale. The calculations exclude delivery costs, fees, and repeat purchases.

The point of the model is the middle column. Support that doubles how often a newcomer's ads turn into clients halves what a client costs them, and brings them close to breaking even on their ads. That is the difference between a member who gives up on advertising and one who can afford to keep going. Whether support really has that effect is exactly what a test can measure, by comparing supported members with members invited later.

If it works less well. Take a pessimistic case: clicks cost $6 instead of $4, and support improves results by only 10%. A client then costs the newcomer about $2,400 without support and $2,180 with it. Either way, buying ads before the offer is proven is a poor deal for newcomers. That is why this case study asks LinkedIn to let members earn first, through bookings, and pay for reach later.

25. Model 2: What LinkedIn Earns When Members Succeed

One member, three years

Start with one person. A newcomer without support spends $400 on ads, wins no clients, and leaves. A newcomer with support stays, starts earning, and spends more on LinkedIn as their business grows.

OVER THREE YEARS	WITHOUT SUPPORT	WITH SUPPORT
Ads bought before giving up	$400	—
Premium Career, two years at about $40 a month	—	$960
Booking fees, 5% of $12,000 a year from year two	—	$1,200
Premium Business and advertising after graduating (year three)	—	$2,340
What LinkedIn earns	**$400, once**	**$4,500**

Not everyone will get that far. Even if only one in five supported members did, and the rest kept Career for six months before leaving, LinkedIn would earn about $1,100 per member on average, nearly three times the $400.

10,000 members, two years

Now take 10,000 newly independent professionals over two years. Without support, a few of them buy subscriptions and ads anyway. With support, more of them win clients, and members who win clients spend more on LinkedIn. The table shows where the extra money would come from, and what it costs.

OVER TWO YEARS	AMOUNT
Premium Career: 1,000 members at about $40 a month, most of whom renew	$816,000
Booking fees: 300 members who earn through project groups	$360,000
Advertising and subscriptions: 100 members who grow their business	$300,000
Revenue with support	**$1,476,000**
Revenue LinkedIn would earn anyway, including members who would buy Career regardless	−$470,000
Business members who move to Career: 200 members, $30 a month less	−$144,000
Cost of running the program	−$300,000
Extra revenue from supporting members	**$562,000**

The program costs little because members run their own project groups and pay for the mentors they book. LinkedIn pays only for a small team that runs the program, reviews mentors, and handles disputes. Even if that cost doubled, supporting members would still bring in about $260,000 more than doing nothing.

All of these numbers are illustrative and counted before LinkedIn's own margins. Prices are based on LinkedIn's current public pricing, because I don't work with internal data; pricing itself is LinkedIn's decision. A test would replace every figure with real ones.

26. Model 3: What to Measure

The main question is whether supported members do better: whether they win their first client sooner, earn more, stay longer, and later spend more on LinkedIn than comparable members invited later. Beyond that, three diagnostic groups show whether the ecosystem is becoming more useful. Each should be tracked by cohort and compared against an appropriate control. Engagement remains relevant, but it should be analyzed alongside practical outcomes, member trust, and incremental economics.

Movement between levels

How many members move from Starting out to Advancing, and from Advancing to Scaling, each quarter, and how many leave instead. A development program works only if it changes these numbers, and only if the change is worth its cost.

How concentrated attention is

The share of feed views that goes to the top 1% of creators. If this concentration rises, it may indicate that distribution is concentrating among established creators; whether this reduces relevant discovery for others must be examined directly. Spreading attention only helps if relevance holds up, so this number is read alongside member satisfaction.

How much of the feed members chose

The share of each member's eligible non-sponsored feed content that comes from people they chose to follow, examined alongside the member's stated preference. The 60/20/up-to-20 proposal in section 15 is a testable mix across all feed categories, not an observed LinkedIn benchmark. My personal observations in Part III involve a different and narrower category: people I know.

Outcome and guardrail measures. Alongside these three groups, compare qualified introductions, member-verified projects or bookings where consented, learning or practice completion, member retention, trust, time to useful outcome, support cost, and net contribution. Monitor complaints, unwanted contact, fraud, suppression of less-visible specialists, unequal impacts, and displacement of useful content. Success on reach or revenue alone is insufficient.

PART VI


Commercial Participation and Revenue Design

This is the bankroll part of the framework. A new member's money and time are limited, and the platform decides how early it asks for them. Ask too early, and promising members leave before they ever earn enough to become good customers. Models 1 and 2 show both sides of that choice.

FEATURE PROPOSAL

27. Pricing That Follows the Member's Level

The three member-development stages described in section 19 imply different commercial needs, rather than permanent platform-assigned customer classes. Startup-oriented software pricing offers a precedent for giving early participants room to establish themselves. LinkedIn can test a similarly graduated model without withholding basic access or placing members in hidden financial categories.



Development stages are optional journeys, not labels of a person's worth.

FIGURE 11 *Support and commercial participation by stage*

Starting out: free first, then a ramp

Members choose how they start. Some are ready to pay from day one, because they have savings, clients waiting, or a clear offer, and they should be able to go straight to Premium Career or a profile expert. Others need to start for free, and the free path has to work on its own. A new independent professional should leave it with a profile that tells their story, a first service or direction, and introductions to members who may help them go further. A member who never purchases promotion should still be able to see people they chose to follow.

Premium Career, built for both paths

For members ready to pay, LinkedIn already has the right product. Premium Career was built for one path: finding the next job. Many people in transition are also testing another, building their own work. If I were LinkedIn, I would let Career support both, at its current price.

INCLUDED IN PREMIUM CAREER	PAID WHEN YOU USE IT
The Book of Success: guided help to put what you are good at into words	Profile experts and mentors, booked by the member
Starting and joining project groups	A disclosed fee on each completed booking
Selling services and Advice Sessions without needing Premium Business first	Reach to **new people**, through small, clearly labeled campaigns

This does not ask LinkedIn to give away its expensive things. What is included is mostly software and member-run groups, which cost little to provide. Human help, ad space, and transactions stay paid, and they are where LinkedIn earns as members grow. Members should never have to pay to make ordinary updates reach people who deliberately follow them. The prices used here are LinkedIn's current public US prices, about $40 a month for Premium Career and $70 for Premium Business (monthly billing, as of November 2026), used for illustration only; pricing is LinkedIn's decision.

Who qualifies, and when members graduate

Premium Career is already open to anyone, so there is no new eligibility to police, and no one has to declare job loss, income, or hardship. Employees testing a side business and people between roles can use it the same way.

Career works like an incubator for independent work, not a permanent home for it. Once a member's bookings through LinkedIn pass a set amount in a year, for example $25,000, selling continues under Premium Business. LinkedIn already sees those bookings, so no income checks are

needed. That makes the path a ladder through products LinkedIn already sells: free, then Career, then Business, then Sales Navigator and advertising. The threshold is a hypothesis to test, not a LinkedIn program.

Advancing: earn when the member earns

LinkedIn's Advice Sessions show the problem with the current order. A newly independent professional in the US can sell paid one-on-one sessions, but only after paying for a Premium Business subscription. Payment companies such as Stripe charge a fee on each successful payment, and freelance marketplaces such as Upwork and Fiverr take a share of each job. LinkedIn could test a transparent fee on completed, on-platform paid bookings through an expanded Services page or Advice Sessions, and let Premium Career members sell from their first booking, rather than requiring Premium Business first. This would require payment processing, tax, refunds, jurisdictional compliance, and a clear disclosure that the fee is a proposal rather than current LinkedIn policy.

The same fee would apply when project groups sell their services, or when members sell mentoring or profile help to one another, and it would help pay for the mentor review and dispute handling described in section 22.

The fee can be lower than the 10–20% freelance marketplaces commonly charge, for two reasons. LinkedIn does not have to pay to attract clients, because they are already there, and paying in stages and shared reputation keep most disputes inside the group. The right level, perhaps between 5% and 10%, is something to test.

At this level, the platform also helps members move to small, well-targeted campaigns aimed at their ideal customers, with budgets that start where they can afford and grow with their revenue.

Scaling: the full commercial products

Once a member's business is established, the full products make sense: Premium Business, advertising, Sales Navigator, and hiring. The platform can recommend relevant tools, but members should be able to access products without obtaining a platform-assigned status.

Guardrails

Paid reach still has to earn its place. Small campaigns for new members should satisfy the same standards as other paid advertisements and count toward the test's sponsored-content limit. Organic follow relationships must not be secretly pay-to-rank, and purchased reach should never be presented as organic. Programs should be transparent and optional, and a platform should avoid using covert inferences about financial distress to set prices or decide access.

The commercial case

A member who gets useful support early may later earn enough to purchase discovery, transactions, subscriptions, or business tools. Others will never pay but still contribute mentorship, expertise, and relationships. Model 2 illustrates assumptions under which LinkedIn could earn an incremental surplus; it does not prove a quick return or that every successful member will become an advertiser.

28. Why Member Success Pays the Platform

A member joins, works out what they offer, develops skills, contributes, finds collaborators, validates a service, and begins generating revenue. At a later stage, they may buy advertising, advanced business tools, recruiting services, or subscriptions. Others who never become direct customers may still create value through knowledge, trust, and relationships that make the platform useful to commercial groups.

There is also a defensive reason. Today, many newly independent professionals cannot afford the ad auction, so they leave LinkedIn or take their paid work to other platforms. Supporting them keeps them, and the ones who succeed become the next Premium Business, Sales Navigator, and advertising customers. Seen this way, member success is not a cost to subscription revenue. It is where future subscription revenue comes from.

A healthy model measures both kinds of contribution and avoids assuming every member should pay immediately.

The testable proposition is that a platform's longer-term economics can improve when more members reach outcomes they value and choose to stay.

PART VII

Testing the Ideas

29. How to Test It

Every ecosystem I've built started small, and that is how I would start at LinkedIn. A first test could invite 120 members who say they have recently left a role and are exploring independent work, and let them form their own project groups, with a pool of reviewed mentors they can book. A small team runs the test, reviews mentors, and handles disputes. Turning on Open to Work should not be treated as consent on its own, and invitations should not depend on popularity or on a prediction of who will spend money later.

To know whether support works, the test compares members invited early with comparable members invited later, chosen at random where possible. In the first 90 days, it looks for early milestones: a clear offer, a first collaboration, a first paid booking. Over at least a year, it looks at what takes longer: steady income, how long members stay, and what they later spend on LinkedIn. It also counts client requests per project group, and the cost of review and support for each result.

Safety and trust are part of the result. The test tracks harassment, false credentials, poor advice, unwanted outreach, and whether some members are served worse than others. Members should understand which information is used, control their stated goals, and be able to challenge decisions about them. A test that earns revenue while losing members' trust would not count as a success. The program grows only when results hold up and the revenue covers its cost, one specialty at a time.



Pre-register the outcomes. Report net contribution and unintended harms alongside the results.

FIGURE 12 *An outcomes-led LinkedIn test*

30. Three Objections, and How to Handle Them

A product or finance team would raise three objections to this framework. Each has an answer inside the framework itself.

Most members never change their settings

The design cannot assume everyone changes settings. A relationship-first feed allocation such as 60/20/up-to-20 could be offered as an experimental starting preset, while members choose other mixes and actual supply is respected. LinkedIn can ask one optional question after a voluntary signal such as creating a Services page or enabling Open to Work; these signals are prompts for confirmation, not proof of financial or career circumstances. A 60–90 day review can be skipped. Adoption and annoyance must be measured.

Some paying members will move to a cheaper plan

If Career lets members sell services, some members who pay for Premium Business only to sell Advice Sessions will move to Career. On current public prices, LinkedIn loses about $30 a month, or $360 a year, for each. But a member who gets support is more likely to win clients, and at a 5% fee LinkedIn recovers the full $360 once that member books about $7,200 of work a year, less than one engagement like the example in section 21. Members who pass the graduation threshold move back to Business. The honest risk is members who move and never book anything; the test should measure how many there are. Model 2 already subtracts this loss.

Any signal that brings reach will be gamed

The moment reply rates or peer assessments bring visibility, some members will try to fake them. So no single signal should determine recognition, discovery, or penalties. Repeated patterns, work samples, and peer reviews can be combined, with checks for coordinated behavior, bias against newcomers, false positives, and privacy. Detection is not automatically easy. Rules need to be transparent, penalties proportionate, and material decisions reviewable by a person.

All three answers share one idea. The design assumes some members will game it, some will move to cheaper plans, and some groups will fail, and it is built to work anyway.

31. Beyond LinkedIn

I wrote this case study around LinkedIn, but the problems in it belong to every platform that earns money from professionals. Professional networks, community platforms, talent marketplaces, professional associations, learning platforms, enterprise knowledge communities, and industry ecosystems all decide who their members are, what they want, how they progress, and how the business earns as they do. Each must choose its own roles, progression criteria, economics, data requirements, and evaluation methods.

A community platform such as Circle or Mighty Networks starts from the opposite position to LinkedIn. It already hosts the small groups, programs, and paid memberships, but it has no professional identity graph and little demand from clients and employers. For a platform like that, the framework points to the parts it can add: matching members with complementary skills, helping hosts package joint offers, verifying the outcomes members reach, and earning when members earn. Project groups, in section 21, may fit a community platform even better than LinkedIn.

Inside a company, the same framework applies to employees. People learn to use AI at very different speeds, and what one person figures out rarely reaches the rest of the team on its own. Roles, stages, recognition, and matching work the same way there. I call this Human–AI Work Design. Unlike a network, a company can assign work, so the question there is how people and AI share it inside a team.

No single feed or business model works everywhere, so each network has to test its own.

CONCLUSION

Designing Ecosystems Around What People Can Accomplish

Knowledge sharing made the first generation of professional networks valuable. AI now makes much of that knowledge available on demand, so the next question is what a network can do for people beyond giving them information.

This case study proposes an answer: help members turn what they know into work and income, and design the platform's business model around that progress.

LinkedIn already has many of the ingredients: identities, relationships, learning, commercial products, people with deep experience, and AI systems. The strategic question is whether those ingredients can support a measurable journey from expertise to opportunity without forcing people to purchase their way into basic participation.

I used LinkedIn because it makes that question concrete, and this is what I would do in its position. Every platform that earns money from professionals faces the same question, and any of them can start with a small test and find out.

> *A network can build a stronger long-term business by helping more of its members get somewhere, and by demonstrating that the benefit outweighs the cost.*

Success should be measured by what members become able to do, what they build together, the trust they retain, and the economics that keep the system healthy.

If professional networks make money from professionals trying to build a livelihood, shouldn't their business models also depend on helping those professionals succeed?

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Human–AI Ecosystem Design



Dessi Popova is based in the south of Spain, where she lives with her 10-year-old son. Building digital ecosystems began for her in the video gaming industry, out of a passion for communities, and over 17 years it took her through gaming, recruitment and career platforms, coaching marketplaces, finance, and life sciences.

She has worked in hybrid roles since 2009 and remotely since 2013, and has advised leaders on remote and hybrid leadership through her consulting practice. Her work has reached more than 10 million community members and over 200,000 remote and hybrid workers.

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Research Notes and References

Scope, method, and limitations

This is a practitioner-led strategic case study, not a representative survey of LinkedIn members and not an audit of LinkedIn's internal systems. The case comprises (1) publicly available LinkedIn and Microsoft disclosures, (2) selected research on platform and advertising economics, (3) the author's firsthand experience building other digital ecosystems, and (4) three small, nonrandom samples of the author's own LinkedIn feed from late October 2026. The author supplied the observations and business-history figures; they have not been independently audited for this publication.

The LinkedIn feed counts are descriptive only. They use different relationship definitions in different samples, without a standardized sampling window or independent coding, and should not be pooled or generalized to LinkedIn's full membership. Percentages are rounded. They cannot establish what changes LinkedIn's algorithm caused, what a typical member sees, or whether paid placements displaced a given organic post.

The financial models use hypothetical customer behavior and unit prices. They deliberately distinguish expected values from observed customers and present revenue as revenue rather than margin. LinkedIn's real acquisition economics, margin structure, cohort transitions, staffing costs, and ad-inventory tradeoffs are unavailable. The models establish testable conditions, not expected company returns.

External-company results and product launches are cited with their stated dates. The references were reviewed against available public sources in November 2026 for the key company figures and product claims, but they should be checked again at publication. Claims about the author's professional achievements remain practitioner-supplied, and third parties have not been contacted as part of this review. Concept screens and figures are illustrations created for this case study.

Evidence categories

- **Verified public evidence:** Published company results, product announcements, and engineering disclosures.
- **Practitioner evidence:** The author's firsthand experience with communities, gaming ecosystems, and platform-dependent businesses.
- **Proposed design:** Features, classifications, feed controls, and operating arrangements introduced as hypotheses.
- **Illustrative mathematics:** Transparent scenarios used to explain mechanisms, not forecasts of a named platform.

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CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

If you work on professional networks, AI-supported experiences, or platform economics, I'd be interested in what you would challenge, test, or build differently. Let's continue the conversation on LinkedIn.

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